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COMPETENCY AND PRIVELEGE OF WITNESSES UNDER SECTION 829 OF THE
NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE.
It is imrossible to calculate the influence which interest
in

a given cause, -or in

tn- ovent of a given suit, will exercise

on the mind of a given individual.

On so::e minds a very slight

interest will act sufficiently to induce perjury; on others very
great interests would be powerless.

It being impossible to de"

tect the numberless ways in which parties may be, directly or indirectly, interested in a particular event, the exclusion was
limited, by the common law, to the parties to the action and others having a legal interest in the event thereof.

The rule ex-

cluding parties was founded on the interest which parties to a
suit were supposed to have in it.

Consequently, when it appeared

that they had none, or that any which they ever had, had been removed, their evidence was receivable.

The husbands or wives of

the parties to the suit or proceeding, were also considered as
incompetent.

This being on the theory that husband and wife wene

the same person in

lawand had the same affections and interest.

Various statutory changes in the United States and England
have reversed this rule, and the general rule now is that interest is not a cause for the rejection of evidence, and parties to
the record of a suit, or the husbands or wives of such parties,
are competent witnesses in the suit; the fact of their being
interested affecting only their credibility.
This *esult

is accomplished in the State of New York by

section 828 of the Code of Civil Proceedure which provides that

a person shall not be excluded or excused from being a witness,
by feason of his or her interest in the event of an action or
special proceeding;or because he or she is a party thereto;or
the husband or wife of a party theretoor of a person in whose
behalf an action or special proceeding is broughtprosecuted,opposed or defended,
A husband or wife hashowever,by a subsequent section been
rendered incompetent upon the trial of an action,or the hearing
upon the merits of a special proceeding founded upon the allegation of adultery;except to prove the marriage and disprove the
allegation of adultery, They cannot,moreover,be compelled,or
without the consent of the other if living,allowed to disclose
a confidential eommunication made by one to the other during
marriage, And in an action for criminal conversation the plaintiff's wife id not a competent witness for the plaintiff,
Allowing the unrestricted evidence of parties or persons
interested in th e event of an action or special proceeding is
open to one great objection,viz,,that in cases where the cause
of

I action arose out of a personal transaction or communica-

tion had with a person who has since died 4 or become insane,there
is great danger of injustice being done to the estate of the
deceased person of lunatic,by reason of misrepres6ntation,concealment or perjury,on the part of the other party to the transaction.
The legislatures hf the different states have wisely guarded against such an injustice;and the testimony of a party or in-

terested witness is generally not admissible,as against the estate of a deceased person or lunatic,or a person succeeding to
the interest of such deceased person or luratic. And in England
the courts,without any express statute,hold t at the testimony
of a party to personal transactions with the deceasedwhich exonerate himself,is not sufficient,at least in equityto sustain
a decree unless corroberated.
Hill v.Wilson LR.8 Ch.App.888
The New York statute in its present form (section 829 of
the Code of Civil Proceedure) is perhaps the most successful
statute yet enacted upon this subject* It provides as follows;
"Upon the trial of an actionor the hearing upon the merits
of a special proceeding,a party or a person interested in the
eventor a person fromthrough or under whom such a party or
interested person derives his interest or title by assignment or
otherwiseshall not be examined as a witness in his own behalf
or interest,or in behalf of the party s-acceeding to his title or
interest against the executor,administrator or survivor of a
deceased person or the committee of a lunatic,or a person deriving his title or interest fromthrough or under a deceased person or lunatic,by assignment or otherwise concerning a personal
transaction oii communication between the witness and the deceased person or lunaticexcept wh ere the executor4,administrator,
survivor,committee or person so deriving title or interest is
examined in his own behalf,or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or communication. A person shall. not be deemed interested

for the purposes of this section by reason of his being a stockholder or officer of

any banking corporation which is a party

to the action or proceeding,or interested in the event thereof."
This section was not originally enacted in its present successful form,but is the product of numerous revisions,amendments
and alterationswhich the experience of years has shown to be
most judicious and fair to all parties who may be affected by it
Section 351 of the Code of Proceedure,as originally enacted,(afterward changed to section 398) was a sweeping provision that:
"No person offerred as a witness shall be excluded by reason of his interest in the event of the action." And the purpose
of the succeeding section,(afterward changed to 399),was simply
to exclude from the operation of the

,ppeeeding section"a party

to the action'"any person for wh ose imediate benefit it is pro
secuted or defended'and"any assignor of a thing in action assign
ed for the purpose of making him a witness."
In 1851 by section 399 of the Code of Proceedure it was ere
acted that when an assignor of a thing in action,or contract,was
examined as a witness,on behalf of any person deriving title
through or from him,the adverse party might offer himself as a
witness to the same matter in his own behalf and shall be so receivede But that such assignor shall not be admitted to be examined in behalf of any person deriving title through or from him,
against an assignee or an executor or administrator.unless the
other party to such contract or thing in action,whom the defendant or plaintiff representeas living,and his testimony could
be procured for such earninationp
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The section was again amended in 1857,but no important
change was made in the part which relates to this subject,until
1860. In the amenCment of that year the subject matter of the
testimony was an important element. And it was provided that the
examination should hot be"in respect to any transactions had
personally between the deceased person and the witness."
The amendment of 1862 provided that where the executors,administrators,heirs at law.next of kin,or assignees were examined on their own behalf,i regard to any conversation or transaction had between the deceased person and the assignor,or
party respectively,then the assignor or party might be examined
in regard to such conversation or transaction, but not in regard
to any new matter. In 1863 a provision was added that:"If a part
ty dies after his testimony is taken and before it is used on
the trial,the other party shall be competent as to the same matter."
In 1866 the section was largely elaboratedand all persons
who had a legal or equitable interest,which might be affected by
the event of the action,were excluded. The examination was forbidden not only in behalf of the party,but also in behalf of any
other party. And the privilege was extended to insane persons.
During the following year the court of appeals decided that
the clause"in respect to any transaction had personally between
the deceased person and the witness",did not exclude evidence of
transactions or communications which took olace in the presence
of the witness between deceased and a third person,and in which
the witness did not participate.

Lobdell v.Lobdell,36 N.Y. 327
The legislature thereupon,again amended the section,and
among other minor changes,omitted the words"had personally"and
rendered the witness incompetent to testify to"any transaction
or conmnanication between"the witness and a person since deceased. This provision was found to be too broadas under it the
courts were obliged to exclude the testimony of a witness to letters which passed between them.
Resigne v.Mason,58 Barb%89
Accordingly,in 1869 the law was again amended by changing
the prohibition to"any personal transaction or communication,"so
that it then stood as follows:
"Nparty to any action or proceeding,nor any person intereded in the event thereof,nor any person from,through or under
whorny such party or interested person derives any interest or
title by assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness
in regard to any personsl transaction or communication between
such witness and a person at the time of such examination deceased,insane or lunatic,against the executor,administrator,heir
at law,next of kinassigneelegatee,devisee,or survivor of such
deceased person or lunatic, But this prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communisation as to wh ich any such
executor,administratorheir at law,next of kinassigneelegatee,
devisee,survivor or committee sh all be examined on his own be;.'
half,or as to wh ich the testimony of such deceased person or
lunatic shall be given in evidence."

The section remained in this form down to 1878 when it was
practically reenacted into the present section 829 of the Code
of Civil Proceedure;about

the only change made,being to limit

the incompetency to evidence offerred in behalf of the party or
person testifying,or of the person claiming from,through or under him,whereas the former section rendered the witness incompetent no matter in whose behalf it was offerred.
To What Courts and Proceedings Applied.
On its first enactment and down to 1857 the statute applied
only to the trial of actions. In that year it was extended to
embrace proceedings. In 1860 proceedings

in Surrogate's Courts,

and summary proceedings were specially mentioned. But since 1865
no particular special proceedings have been designated,and the
application of the statute has been common to every form of action and special proceeding.
Naturally the rule is often invoked in the various proceedings in Surrogate's Courts,and has been held to apply to applications for probate,for letters of administration,to sell real
estate of decedent l for payment of debts and funer al expenses;
to proceedings for discovery of assets,for judicial settlermt of
accounts,and generally to actions and proceedings in any court
in relation to decedents' estates;as upon the reference of disputed claims,or the trial of special issues concerning the due
executiom of a will. The section applies to justices'courtsand
has been held to appl~to the trial of a feigned issue out of
chancery under section 823 of the code,

1atks Y 4ndrewsj56 Hun 391

But the simple verification of a claim against a decedents

es-

tate by the claimant is not rendered incompetent;nor are proofs
of loss made to an insurance company,&qpyovidd

by its regula-

tions, The section is also held not to apply to a proceeding
against an attorney to compel

iAm to pay over money alleged to

belong to his clients The reason being that upon motion to the
Court to control the action of an attorney the Coutt is not restricted to the same rules of evidence which govern in an action
between parties%
Re Purdy vStewart 16 W.Dig.284
To Whose Testimony Applied.
The section mentions parties,persons interested,and persons
from through or under whom such parties or interested pers~ns
derive their interest or title

by assignment or otherwise. But

the mere fact that one is a party is not alone sufficient to render him incompetents For a party to the proceeding as well as a
person not a party must be interested in the event or he cannot
be excluded. And it is not material whether he had or had not
an interest at the time of the transaction or communication,as
interest at the time of the trial alone disqualifies% It seems
to be the same in an action as to whether the party appears in
an individual or representative capacity.
Poucher v.Scott 33 Hun 223
But upon an application for probate the rule seems to be different. An executor emen though he be the proponent,being then not
considered as a party within th e meaning of the sectionso as
to render him incompetent to prove the execution of the will.
RUgg Vogg 83 NY#592
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Just who are, and who are not, included as persons interested, is a serious question, and one concerning which there
have been many adjudications.

The true test of the interest of

a witness seems to be that he ,'ciild either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgement,

or that the

record will be legal evidence for or against him in some other
action or proceeding,

It

is

the same interest which would ex-

clude at common law and must be present, certain and vested,
and not uncertain, remote or contingent.
Connelly v. O'Connor, 117 N. Y. 91.
But where the interest is a conditional one, the performance of
the condition being in the discretion of the party, he will
nevertheless be regarded as a person interested.
Matter of Burke, 5 Redf, 399,
The beneficiaries tnder a will would therefore be incompetant
to sustain the probate, or the heirs at law and next of kin to
oppose probate.

An administrator would be incompetent in an ac-

tion to recover a debt alleged to be due the estate; his percentage on the amount which the estate receives being considered
as a sufficient interest to bar his evidence.

A stockholder

would likewise be incompetent in behalf of his corporation, unless it be a banking corporation; stockholders in a banking corporation being by the last amendment of the section, in 1881,
especially exempted from the provisions of the statu4

A woman

baving an inchoate right of dower depending upon the event; a
lawyer whose fees depend upon the result;

and a subsequent mort-

gagee in a foreclosure suit, have all been held incompetent un-

der this provision of the section
It is not enough to disqualify that the witness is interested in the question involved; he must be interested in the
event of the action.
Eisenlard v. Clum, 126 N. Y. 522.
And the s'ction does not mean an interest in any event of the
action, but an interest in the event as respects the party who
calls him as a witness.

The words "interested in the event" are

to be construed to mean, and must be limited in their application , to the issue or question as to which the witness is called to testify.

This being the rule well established in the

common law courts on the question of competency, before the code
was enacted.

The language of the section in reference to ex-

cluding the testimony of assignors is so expliit that it has
given rise to comparatively few adjudications.

Grantors of

real estate, vendors of chattels, indorsers of notes and checks,
the assignor of a mortgage, and the assignor of an equity of
redemption, have all been held incompetent under this provision.
On the other hand a father who has surrendered to a minor child
her wages in advance of their being earned, is competent in a
suit brought by the child to recover her wages, against the administrator of the employer; the child not deriving its title
to the wageSfrom the father.
Shirley v. Bennett,

6 Lans.

512.

And on an accounting, a claimant to whom the executors have paid
a claim, is held competent for the executors to prove his contract with the deceased, they not having derived any title or

interest from him.
In re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 240.
Thus the lien which an attorney has for his costs on his
client's cause of action is rot sufficient to render him in competent.

Nor is a possible right to curtesy or dower such an

interest as is regarded by the statue.
Cooper v. Monroe, 28 N. Y. Supp. 222.
So the statue has reference to transfer of title or interest by
assignmient or otherwise:

Therefore the maker of a note is com-

petent, in an action against the personal representatives of the
accommodation indorser; for the holder does not derive his interest from the accommodation indorser, within the meaing of
the section.
Converse V. Cook, 31 Hun 417.
Again the interest referred to is an interest in the subject
matter of the action; and the prohibition is not limited to an
examination pertaining to the parts of the action assigned, but
extends to the entire action.

And it matters not that there are

transfers mesne the proposed witness and the party or person
interested.

But whenever one party gives evidence of admissions

by a grantor of the other party, the testimonE of the grantor
is admissible to rebut this evidence, even though it relates to
a transaction with a deceased person through whom the witness
claiis

title.
Cole v. Denul, 3 Hun 610.
In Whose Behalf Offered.
Prior to 1866 incompetency under the statue only extended
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to evidence in behalf of parties or interested persons, but in
the amendment of that year this feature of the statue was lost
sight of, and the evidence of such parties became incompetent in
any event and remained thus down to 1878 when the present section was enacted.
At the present time, therefore, the witness is competent
when not testifying in his own behalf or interest, or in behalf
of the party succeeding to his title or interest.

Thus a re-

siduary legatee under a will may testify to transactions with
the testator, in behalf of a claimant against the estate.
Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y.

251.

Or the maker of a note is competent to establish the liability
of an indorser; he being liable upon tIhe note in any event of
the action.

But where the testimony of the witness, although

directly in behalf of another, must indirectly be for his own
benefit, it will not be received.

As where a subsequent mort-

gagee defendant in foreclosure attempts to testify in behalf of
his mortgagor.
Hadsall v.

Scott,

26 Hun 617.

But it has been held that the maker of a note, who was a defendant but had not answered, is incompetent to testify in behalf of
his surety, on the ground that he was interested in avoiding a
judgement against the surety, which would entitle the surety to
prosecute and obtain a judgement against him, which he would be
compelled to pay.
Church v. Howard,

79 N.

Y,

415.

Any evidence which would be incompetent if offered in behalf of
the witness, would likewise be incompetent if offered in behalf

of a party succeeding to his title or interest.

Against Whom the Testimony is Incompetent.
As the section now stands, executors, administrators or
survivors of a deceased person, or the committee of a lunatic,
or a person deriving his title or interest from, through or
under a deceased person or lunatic, by assignment or otherwise,
are specially mentioned as persons in whose favor the statue is
enacted*

But it was not until the amendment of 1866, that the

provision in favor of survivors and lunatics first appeared.
And not until the amendment of 1869 was the committee of a lunatic, or insane person, specially mentioned.

The present section

applies in favor of an executor propounding a will for probate.
For, although techmically a proponent is not an executor under a
will until it is admitted to probate, yet,

if it

is well exe-

cuted as regards all legal formalities, he holds before the surrogate the position of an executor, and is protected by the sect ion.
Schoonmaker v. Wolford, 20 Hun 166.
And it

is

held that

in

ai action by an administrator,

aho has

received his letters, evidence of conversations may not be introduced, tending to

show that the alleged deceased is still

living.
Parhan v.
But th

Moran,

4 Hun.

717.

statuttdoes not apply in favor of a creditor petitioning

to sell a decedent's real estate to pay debts, as against another
creditor*

The creditor not being a party included under the

stat At
Jones v, Le Baron,

3 Dem. 37.

The provision applies in favor of the surviving partner of
a firm, unless lie was present at the interview between the witness and the deceased partner which is
dence.

And it

is

sought to be put in evi-

I-eld that the term "surviving partner" in-

cludes one who, though not technically a member of the firm, has
become liable to third persons as such by reason of his acts.
Farley v. Norton, 67 How. Pr. 438.
One of the joint makers of a note is, however, not a survivor.
He being liable to a separate action before, as well as after,
the death of the maker.
The provision favoring a person deriving his title or interest from the deceased or lunatic is not confined to a person deriving such title or interest directly, but applies, even
though there have been several mesne conveyances.
Pope v. Allen, 90 N. Y. 298.
It is extended to a person contesting probate;
Matter of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516.
the words "any person deriving his title or interest" being construed as any person claiming to derive title or interest*

But

neither a mortgagee nor his assignee are considered as deriving
their title or interest from, through or under the mortgagor, so
as to claim the protection of the statue.
Holcomb v.

Campbell,

118 N. Y. 46.

Where the executor, administrator, survivor, cormittee or
assignee is interested in thes uit, not as such, but in his own

15
right, the section is not applicable.

As when a wife has been

induced to convey her dower interest by the fraudulent representations of her husband, she is not precluded from giving evidence of such fraudulent representations, as the grantee of the
husband does not deriv3 the interest claimed from the husband.
Witthaus v. Shack, 105 N. Y. 332.
Also, where the administrator brought an action to set aside a
deed made by deceased in fraud of creditors;

it was held that

he was not protected as he then represented the creditors and
not the deceased.
Miller v. Davis, 60 Hun 198.
Nature of Testimony Excluded,
The question as to what does and what does not constitute
a personal transaction or coranunication within the meaning of
the statue is perhaps the most perplexing one that arises in
connection with this section.

This is owing, principally, to

the fact that the provision may be applied to almost as great a
variety of cases as there are human transactions.

And for that

reason no fixed rules can properly be made; the most that can be
done being to exaimine the decisions on this point and observe
the tendency of the courts in the application of the statute,
The language of the statuteis that the person shall not be
examined "concerning a personal transaction or conmmunication
between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic".

As it

refers to personal transactions or communications, it does not,
of course, apply to transactions of agents ',ith tile deceased or
lunatic, nor to transactions or co °imunications with agents of
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the deceased; neither does it apply to transactions or communications with the deceased agent of the opposite party.
The transaction need not necessarily have been a private
one, or confined to the witness and tote deceased, as the policy
of the statuttexcludes testimony of' an interested witness concerning any transaction with the deceased in which the aitness
in any. manner participated, or of any cof
ence or hearil-g, if he in

unication in his pres-

any way was a party tnereto.

Accord-

ingly it was held that testimony was improperly received of interested witnesses as to conduct and actions of the deceased,
tending to siow his enfeebled and dependent condition, and as to
statements rlade by him, although not addressed to the witness,
and made in ignorance of his presence.
Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y, 316.
And it is even held that testimony as to the appearance of testator, as indicating his incompetency to make a will, observed
by an interested witness, is within the section.
In re McArthur's Will, 12 N. Y. Supp. 822,
The simple fact that the transaction or connunication was had
is not incompetent, unless that is the material fact to be provent
Monerick v. Marvel, 90 N. Y, 656.
But the silence df the deceased, provided such silence may be
construed to mean assent, comes within the section.
Oliver v. Freleigh, 36 Hun 6315.
The death of one of two persons jointly interested, does not,
however, render a party incompetent as a-ainst the survivor, to
testify to personal trars actions or comnmunications with the

decedent, at which the survivor was present.
Kale v. Elliott, 1'. Hun 198.
Extrinsic facts

may also be testified

to,

as the birth

of de-

ceased, the signature of deceased, possession of papers, or Slaih5
an entry in decedent's books at a certain time.

But it has been

held that a wife is incompetent to testify as to her marriage
with deceased, or a creditor as to payment or nonpayment, or as
to services performed for deceased.
McMurray v.

1McMurray,

63 Hun 183.

If the party was present but did not participate in the
conversation, which took place wholly between the deceased and
third parties it was formerly held that he would not be incompetent to testify thereto, as it

.vas not a personal transaction

or coninunication.
Badger v6

Badger,

83 N.

Y. 54-.

But at the present time there seems to be an inclination to
hold that an interested witness is incompetent to testify to
any conversation on the part of the deceased, whether it was addressed to him, or to third persons, and in which he took no
part.
Devlin v. Greenwich Say.
At any rate it

is certain that

Bank, 125 N. Y. 576.
if rfe took any part

view he cannot testify as to it,
in which he participated.

even though he omit the matters

This v-ould also apply in a case in

which, although he had been silent,
to assent.

in the inter-

his silence was equivalent

Where the parties taking part in the interview with

the deceased are jointly interested with the
to give evidence of the

-arty who attempts

interview, they will not be regarded as
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third persons, and evidence of the interview aould therefore be
inadmissible.
is

All testimony, whether negative or affir;native,

equally affected by the statute,

Th:is proof that no personal

transaction took place is equally inadmissible with evidence
that one did take place.

But it is held that after evidence has

been given by a third person who claims to have been present,
concerning a personal transaction or communication betwveen a decedent and a party or interested person, the latter, in his own
behalf may give evidence, the nature and substance of which is,
in effect, a statement that there was no interview at the time
and place testified to by the third person, but he may not deny
that the transaction or communication took place as testified to
by the third person.

Thus he may show that he was in a differ-

ent place at the time mentioned, or that the testator was at a
different place at such time,

or that the witness was not pre-

sent at the interview as to which he has testified.
Pinney v. Orth, 88 N. Y,

447.

And it is held that after the transaction or communication has
been proved by other testimony it is competent for the witness
to state that he believed and relied upon the representations of
the deceased as detailed in the prior testimony*
Hard v, Ashley,

117 N.

Y.

606.

It was formerly held that books of account could not be
given in evidence, unless it was shown by disinterested testimony that the party kept correct books, but this rule is changed
and thd present holding seems to be that the books of a party
can be proved against a deceased person, as they do not constitute a personal transaction or comfUnication.

Young v. Luce, 21 N, Y. Supp. 225.
When such Testimony Becomes Competent.
The provision oi the

section in this regard enacts that

exception must be made "where the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or person so deriving title or interest is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or
deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or communication."

The testimony must therefore have

been offered in behalf of tfle party claiming under the deceased
person or lunatic.

And a party cannot, by examining his adver-

sary as to a transaction with a deceased person, claim that the
evidence thus elicited is given by the adversary in his own behalf, and that therefore he may contradict him.
Corning v. Walker, 28 Hun 435;

100 N. Y. 547.

The fact that the executor etc., has testified to one transaction does not render a party competent to testify to any other
transaction, as the purpose of the exception is solely to prevent any inequality and not to give any advantage to either.

In

other words, the testimony of a party is competent where it
tends to repel a presumption arising from the facts testified
to by the executor*
Martin v. Hillen, 142 N. Y. 140.
But proof of declarations 4

a deceased by competent third per-

sons does not open the door for the admission of what would
otherwise

be plainly incompetent.

Lyon v.

Ricker,

141 N.

Y. 225.

Where testimony of the deceased plaintiff given upon a
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former trial is read in behalf of his representative at the second trial, the defendant may contradict, correct or supplant
the same as to all that took place at the interview in question.
Potts v.

Mayer,

86 N. Y. 302.

But the testimony of a decedent in

anotrer action brought upon

another cause of action, vill not render evidence competent within this exception.

Objections.
In regard to the mode of entering an objection it should be
borne in mind that the objection must be specific and not in
general,

Thus where a witness is objected to under the section

before any testimony has been taken, the objection will not be
considered, even though in the course of the examination incompetent testimony is subsequently admitted.

The courts holding

that the specific testimony must be objected to.
Sanford ve Ellithorp, 95 N. Y.

48,

The objection being once properly made to the testimony, as incompetent under the section, it is sufficient, and it is not
necessary to renew the objection and exception each time similar
testimony is offered by the same witness, or others standing in
the sa:e relation to the deceased.
Schoonmaker v. Woolferd, 20 Hun 166.
Even though the objection be not made at the time the evidence
is offehed, the incompetent evidence may be afterward stricken
out in the discretion of the court, if the omission can be shown
to have been from mistake or inadvertence.
Miller v. Montgomery, 78 N. Y. 282.
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And in making the objection, it is sufficient to object to the
testimony on the ground that it relates to a personal transaction with the deceased by an interested ,witnoss, without referring to the section of the Code,
Sanford v. Ellithorp, 95 N. Y. 48o
But where the defendant objected to evidence, as "hearsay and
incompetent", but not as inadmissible under section 829, it was
held that the objection was not sufficiently specific to apprise
the court and plaintiffs that it was directed to the statutory
incompetency of the witnesses, and was therefore not available*
Bell v.

Bumstead, 14 N. Y. Supp, 697,

If the original question does not necessarily show the incompetency of the testimony, the defendant has the right to
cross-examine the witness in regard to the answer, without waiving his objection, and when from such examination the testimony
appears incompetent under this section, it should be stricken
out on motion.

But ordinarily the objection must be raiked when

the testimony is offered.

Where incompetent evidence is erron-

eously received by the court, after being properly excepted to,
it can only be disregarded on appeal when it can be seen that it
did no harm,
Foote v. Beecher, 78 N. Y. 155.
Conclusion,
The policy of this statue, as will have been observed,
rests upon different grounds from the common law rule excluding
the evidence of interested witnesses,

The examination being

prohibited in the special cases mentioned, not simply on account

22
of interest,

but mainly upon the ground of the enforced silence

Of the other party to the transaction,

The law considering it

just and proper that where death or insanity has closed the
mouth or clouded the reason of one of the parties, the other
party who would thereby be permitted to testify uncontradicted
to transactions, which obviously the deceased or lunatic could
contradict or explain, should not be permitted to pr6ve such
transactions against the representatives of the deceased, or
lunatic.

To prevent evasion the restriction was not limited to

an interested witness, called in his own behalf, but extends to
all cases where it is sought to examine the witness in behalf of
a party or person interested in the event, who derives title to
the subject matter of the action by assignment or otherwise from
the witness,

To prevent injustice it confines the prohibition

to evidence in behalf or interest of the witness, and only to
personal transactions or communications.
application, it

And to prevent unequal

does not apply against one side when the other

side has gone into the subject of the interview.

Considering

these facts we are convinced that the New York statue is a model
of its kind, and has been eminently successful.
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